Jim Gray: No, it was called VSS.
John Nauman: But one of the marketing guys was looking at a slide - not a slide, a poster; IBM was big on posters - and it was the Santa Teresa lab announcement with this eagle, just sort of soaring. And he looked at it and said, "That's what we'll call the project; we'll call it Eagle." So we'd been calling it something else - it might have been VSS - and what we had to do was go back through the whole document (by this time the specification was probably forty or fifty or eighty pages) and we had to replace all the ... I don't think there was a global replace option in the editor we were using at the time, so we were using SCRIPT, so we put in &PROJVAR was the name of the project, so you'd fill in &PROJVAR and you'd get Eagle everywhere. So after about, probably, six months, after we'd moved into Santa Teresa and discovered there weren't any eagles, we decided to change the name again, and at that point we changed it to Ampersand because that just seemed to be a better name than trying to change the project name all the time; we figured no one would ever figure that one out.
Roger Miller: I thought that was the lawyers who came in and said, "That's a predatory bird and you can't use that name." One of those wonderful stories that sounds great, but it's probably not true.
John Nauman: It's untrue. We just got tired of trying to think up names and the marketing guy had left, so we decided to just call it Ampersand. Probably the thing that convinced me that the project was going to die was we'd been working on it at Santa Teresa for about a year and we were having regular review meetings of the document. We'd been doing this document since we were in Palo Alto, so it was more than a year since we'd been working on this document. The average meeting was: you'd go into the room to review the document - the specification - and people would start talking about how there were widows and orphans. Does everybody know what widows and orphans are? This was the topic of conversation: "There's a widow on this page; you've got to fix it." At that point, I said, "Nah, this is the wrong thing to do. We shouldn't probably be doing this. This project is doomed." And it was. We were trying to figure out how to go forward, and what to do about the database stuff. My recollection of this is we had decided that we were going to go relational, but how to do that was something we weren't sure of. And I remember a lot of meetings with Frank King.
Franco Putzolu: When was this?
John Nauman: This was 1978-1979. By then, Franco was there sort of working on the RSS replacement - data manager stuff - and we were wrestling with what to do about the upper areas - the relational data store part of the system. There were two camps. One camp was me and Don Haderle, and the other camp was Frank King and everybody from Research. We felt like the right thing to do was, since MVS was not the same as VM, it was going to be hard to fit this stuff into MVS efficiently, so we probably needed to go in and restructure this stuff a lot. The System R folks felt like it didn't really need that much optimization; it was probably going to be OK.
Jim Gray: Love my dog.
John Nauman: Love me; love my dog. I remember vividly the day that - in fact, I was working for Bob [Jolls] at the time - Bob came and said, "No, the answer is you're going to take this stuff from System R." And we said, "OK. If that's what you want to do, it's a business decision. Let's go do it." So we started working on it. We spent a lot of time and we assembled a team which is - some of the people are here in the room - people who included: Jay Yothers, who isn't here in the room today; Josephine; Roger, who I hired out of another job - I think IBM was his fourth position and fourth company and he told me when I hired him that he wasn't sure that he was going to stick around all that long, but he wanted some experience with a big company, [laughter] and it was bigger then, I think, than it would be now.
Roger Miller: I'm not usually that forthcoming.
John Nauman: Let's see; we hired Mort - John Mortenson - John had already been working in the company, we brought him into the group. We hired Jerry Baker, who is probably the person who has made the most money off of this - next to Larry Ellison; he works for Larry; is he your boss?
Franco Putzolu: No, he's not my boss.
John Nauman: He's in one of the development organizations.
Franco Putzolu: Porting.
John Nauman: OK, that's what he did when he left; he went to Oracle to do UNIX ports, because he had a UNIX background coming out of University of Texas, and didn't like MVS that much. So he made lots of money; the rest of us sort of worked for the good of mankind I think.
Jim Gray: Thank you; we really appreciate it.
John Nauman: But actually we had a lot of fun. There were a lot of interesting things going on. Jim was still helping us out to some extent. Franco was helping us out a lot. Franco was wrestling with how to do DL/1 and SQL with the same underlying data structures, and later he tried to do it again, as I mentioned earlier. But it was a lot of fun. The reason I left - I left IBM in mid-1981 - Jim had just left and called me up and said, "Gee, why don't you come talk to Tandem; they're looking for somebody to manage one of their groups." And so I came up and talked to them. Jim had written a treatise called "MIPS Envy" - I'm sure some of you remember this - which was the reason that Jim purports that he left; I think there's probably some truth to it. When we were doing the DB2 stuff, we had a terminal room at the end of the hall that had six 3270 terminals in it. That was all we had, that was all the compute resource that we were allowed to do DB2. We gradually got more and more 3270's and put them in people's offices, and that was sort of a revolution. Nobody had terminals in their offices; it was terminal rooms that made sense.
Jim Gray: And you were only allowed to log on at certain times, right?
John Nauman: Terminals were expensive. Yes, you could log on on weekends, and you could log on before eight and after six. So Haderle and I and Baker and a few other people would come in at four o'clock in the morning, and you'd tune in the radio sometimes at four o'clock in the morning and you'd hear these whale sounds on the radio station. And we wondered what was going on; why were we here; what were we really trying to accomplish? I was frustrated by some of the same things that Jim was, but I was as frustrated by the fact that I'd been working on the project in 1981 for about four years - if you'd count the Eagle time; that doesn't count the FS time before that - and I could see it was just about done. Here it was, mid-1981, about six months away from shipment, so I figured it was OK for me to leave now, because everything was sort of tied up. So I told Don, "I'm getting out of here. You can take it from here; it's going to be OK." This was about the third time I'd done this to Don - left him with a project that we'd worked on. But this one took a little longer than the others to get finished.
So I went to Tandem, and then we recruited Franco to come to Tandem, and we recruited Mike [Pong] to come to Tandem, and we recruited a number of people to come to Tandem. We stole Don from Esvel.
Don Slutz: Not stole. I walked away.
John Nauman: We built up a pretty strong group at Tandem, which was a lot of fun also; I'll let somebody else talk about that. But the reason I left was I thought things were done, and I wanted to go someplace where it didn't take four years to get a product out.
Franco Putzolu: Yes, I had the same feeling.
John Nauman: And I think that was one of the reasons that Franco came and some of the other people joined. And we did get things done much more expeditiously at Tandem, and I think it was more fun for that reason. I worked at Tandem for four years, and in 1985, after I joined 3Com, I read about the full release of DB2. So I was off by about four years on how long it was going to take to get the full product out. And a lot of that I know, from talking to Don and Josephine and other people, was around just getting it to work in MVS, which was by no means a simple system, and I think we had all underestimated how complex that was going to be and how high the performance requirements were going to be.
Roger Miller: Because as soon as we started shipping it to the early customers in 1982, they started using a lot of four-letter words in their discussions. The first part was fun you know; "Oh my goodness, it's exciting." But right away, there were all these things that we'd done and John said we'd never have to do this. Things like Cold Start: "Oh, no; databases should never have to Cold Start." It took us ten or fifteen person-years to put Cold Start in, after the fact. That was ugly, hard programming to put it in. It took a lot of expertise. We kept scratching our heads and saying, "Why would a customer ever want this stuff?" And the answers kept coming back, "The question is not why they need it, but why you don't have it." So we kept going through problem after problem, and we kept finding these bugs. Oh, Jerry Baker would just go nuts, because Jerry was a high-level language kind of guy, and he was working in the RDS, but he had these fragments, and he had this glue code, and Jerry didn't even want to know what they did: pasting them together, the gluing; we couldn't fix a lot of the fragments, so we kept having to patch and paste. So in November 1982 we shipped it to the six; we shipped it to eighteen about in March of 1983. The big event - Blow-up Announce - and here we go shipping to forty - fifty - sixty customers as we announce: June 7th, 1983. Things suddenly start taking off, and we're in early ship, and running into problem after problem. Sixteen megabytes of memory isn't much; every PC in the room has that much, right? But you only get eight of the sixteen, and eight megs, when you start running a lot of users below the line, sucks. It didn't do the job, and here XA came, and MVS XA 31-bit addressing, and a whole stack of new problems, and incompatibilities that we weren't very comfortable with or used to in MVS. Which of those services go up above the line? "We're not telling you" - kind of responses; there's no list of such changes.
Tom Price: Get the dump.
Roger Miller: Yes, yes, just try it; you'll like it. And so we kept twisting and pacing and it was excruciating. Every once in a while you'd go up and talk to the people in Research and they'd say, "Well gee, I don't understand; it worked when I left." It's been really gratifying to have Mohan come down and say, "Oh, you know, that really is hard" on occasion. It's not really trivial. Because then as we started building users, we finally went into Controlled Availability in September 1984; General Availability; and then clear out in April of 1985 - by that time we had Release 2 coded. Release 2 came out about a year later than that. In Release 2, we threw away the fragments and built a Structure Gen just as you folks were doing HOP and started saying, "Ah, my goodness." Essentially, Release 2 was: go talk to those 250 early users, get the feedback, build it into the product, make them successful. We must have done something, because they've been popping and popping, but after that it gets a little less interesting.
Franco Putzolu: Can you say something about the dual-database strategy?
Roger Miller: You mean the dueling-database strategy?
Franco Putzolu: Was there much controversy inside IBM on the dual-database strategy?
Roger Miller: We've always had a kind of love-hate relationship with the folks in the tower next door, because IMS has almost always been in the tower next door. On the one hand, it's this tremendous heritage; and on the other, a customer often comes through the door and says, "Well, I have to choose IMS or I have to choose DB2; now which should I do?" And there's a fair amount of antagonism - well, just as competing projects, if you will - for resources.
C. Mohan: Somebody should say something about this statement that Frank King was supposed to have made in Australia which cost a lot of headaches. This was the IFIPS Congress or something, right? When he gave a talk on the state of relational or something, and he was supposed to have said this will ...
Roger Miller: Oh yes, and this will kill IMS, essentially. Because all of our crew was painfully aware ...
C. Mohan: Was this 1981; I forget the year. It was some IFIPS Congress where he gave ...
Pat Selinger: It must have been 1980, because IFIPS were every two years.
Roger Miller: And the repercussions for us were minimal. We weren't announced. SQL/DS was about to come out, but SQL/DS wasn't about transaction processing. SQL/DS is VM, queryish, and not really large databases. Today's large databases are terabytes, and real live customers in lots of situations are building six - eight - ten terabyters. SQL/DS kind of runs out of gas in the ten - hundred megabyter range - gigabyte or two gigabyter - it's not a high-end database. We always wanted to scale into - oh, sixty-four gigabytes, that was one of our stupidities, that sixty-four gigabytes [per table] will be enough for a long time.
Franco Putzolu: I thought it was infinity at that time.
Roger Miller: Yes, you can't believe how many folks are really ticked at us for the sixty-four gigabyte limit. Every hard limit in the product, everything that's built around one byte, is wrong. Everything that's limited by two bytes is a problem, and most of the three, four, and even some six and eight-byte sizes. We've tried to remove limits when we could, where it wasn't five thousand lines of code. Everything about name length was wrong. Eighteen is a terrible number. Especially for VARCHARs. We learned these things and haven't been able to change them in a number of cases. And yet we've been very successful.
???: When DB2 for MVS came out, it wasn't billed as a transaction system either, right? It was a Decision Support System?
Roger Miller: Well, we had to be careful, because that's really right what Franco was asking about: dueling databases. We had to be real careful. We weren't solid. We weren't ready to take on IMS. In the best sort of situation, if somebody says, "What's the path length; I'm worried about costs." The answer is 2X, roughly.
Franco Putzolu: So when did the situation change? When was DB2 beginning to be accepted as something good for OLTP?
Roger Miller: Release 2 was really when a lot of that came in, because Release 2 we made that two factor drop down into the one and a half range, and for low-volume transactions that turned out to be pretty acceptable. Because we delivered some flexibility: the ability to recompile instead of having people recode is a big difference. And so folks would be going through a project on IMS and discover, "Gee, I need to put in a couple of extra indexes. Oh, well, if I put in a couple of extra indexes, I can't use them really well; I have to recode to go down the path." That's not a very acceptable choice.
Mike Blasgen: I used to give this talk, five years before.
Roger Miller: It's funny, I was just looking through my DB2 materials, and the Version 1 General Information manual, and as I was watching the foils and saying, "That looks like a pretty faithful rendition; it's missing Don and his beard." But a lot of this material has not changed for two decades.
Bruce Lindsay: I think you're being a little bit self-serving or conservative to say that DB2 wasn't posed as a transaction-processing product because it didn't have the performance, because there were plenty of other people out there making pretty good money with worse performance. It's because IBM protects weak products; protects its own products. Admit it: IBM will not attack its own products, even when they're weak and there's better technology and they have it. Ask Mike about RISC. Ask everybody in here about relational.
Roger Miller: But there's a little of each. It's called, "Would I rather take it out of my left pocket and put it in my right, for ..."
Bruce Lindsay: No, there's a saying that expresses this very well about trying to protect weak products: "If your children are going to be eaten, the best thing is to eat them yourself."
Josephine Cheng: Bruce, that may be true in the past, but I think things have been changing. If you look at the investment that IBM has made on the new products like DB2 Client/Server, it is quite substantial.
Bruce Lindsay: It hasn't changed.
Pat Selinger: We're getting kind of far afield here.
Mike Blasgen: Frank King for example was hard over that you take System R as is. That was non-negotiable. Then he went away. So he became a non-factor in this. But he still played a role in certain policies, like you're saying he gave a talk in 1980, which was after he was gone, I think. One of the issues I was working on, even though I was in Washington, even though I had some job that had nothing to do with database, was that everybody had concluded that we would always have to support DL/1; we would always have to support the old programs. If you look in the Pratt & Whitney report, it says, "Number one objective is we have to have full support for IMS data and IMS programs." Now, when did that go away? Just because nobody could do it?
Roger Miller: Pretty much literally. Right, because we started coding to try to make it happen. And essentially, it came down to a couple of things. Performance: the closer you get to performance, the worse it looks. And the brain killer was you can never tell except during running of the yearly close that there are some things in there that you can't support, because supporting exactly one hundred per cent with complete fidelity to DL/1 was not possible. We got pretty close, but pretty close is never close enough.
Mike Blasgen: Even Frank King's position when he worked for Bob Evans was that we would have to do it.
Franco Putzolu: Oh, yes. That was a given.
Mike Blasgen: And yet what happened was we were saved by the fact that we couldn't. If we could've, we would've.
C. Mohan: I was told that the second release of DB2 was to have been DL/1 support, but it never happened.
Roger Miller: Exactly. We had the spec, we had the running code, we kept going, and we said, "Can we ship a product that is this way?" From IBM we just said, "Here's the product; we can ship it, but will customers accept it?" We tried it on a couple of customers, and "Heck, no!" was the kindest they said. It was nice to have customers who were honest with us.
Franco Putzolu: Was it performance, was it page-locking, was it functionality?
Roger Miller: Performance was a negative, but the primary issue was the inability to tell if the conversion would work. Remember, this is building the calls at runtime, and we had three or four per cent of the calls which were not going to work. There isn't any code inspector that could determine when they were using a function that would fail. So until you can get to one hundred per cent, it's not acceptable. Some of the Brand X vendors can get away with a little less than we can, but the real killer was: you could never tell when it was safe to convert.
Franco Putzolu: When did it die?
Roger Miller: Release 2, essentially. Because we had Release 2 of DB2, which was a 1986 GA. We switched over in about 1984 or 1985 to say we can't do DL/1, so let's go pedal to the metal. Let's support relational, and do what relational DBMS needs to make those customers successful.
Don Slutz: I'm not sure when it was, maybe Don [Chamberlin] can help, but Frank King had Bob Taylor and myself go off for a couple of months and look at supporting DL/1 calls - I think 1978 or 1979; do you know? I was working for you; did you know?
Roger Miller: The team that essentially built it for us were: Sid Kornelis, who came from IMS. Sid knew IMS backwards, forwards, left, and right.
Jim Gray: It had fifty thousand test cases ...
Roger Miller: Yes, we had the IMS regression test bucket.
Jim Gray: ... fifty thousand, which was a number that boggles the mind.
Roger Miller: We had Lloyd Harper, who had the long history of many, many products that never shipped. We had Bob Engles, doing the part working for Homer [Leonard], and Homer was right in line with Bob Evans, down saying, "Well, gee, this product is only a toy until it supports DL/1." They were going to get it to ship until we came to the realization that it didn't matter if we did or not; we couldn't sell it if it did.
Mike Blasgen: And none of the good guys won, right? [laughter]
Jim Gray: I think Oracle. [laughter]
???: No, he meant Tandem. [laughter]
Mike Blasgen: Oh, SQL, this is an SQL review. SQL won.
Josephine Cheng: Well, I was really fortunate. Once I graduated from school, I joined IBM, and I worked in the project Eagle. At that time there were walls and doors that kept everyone out. You know, in Santa Teresa, we have towers that are all connected. They specifically put in doors to separate all the connections to other buildings - you needed a special badge to get in. So I joined the project, and Franco was working diligently; Irv was on an assignment to STL also working very diligently. Occasionally I saw Jim [Gray] and also occasionally I heard loud voices shouting, and I knew it was Andy [Heller].
I worked on the Buffer Manager for about two years, and then I transferred to John Nauman's department. Let me share a couple of experiences I had on our productization of Research code.
Mike Blasgen: You're supposed to be kind.
Josephine Cheng: Yes. Maybe next time I won't be invited. [laughter] I always have to have many system R papers all over my desk to help me understand the code. For instance, there's the part that talks about PTREE nodes. The Parse Tree node has fields called P1, P2, P3, P4, P5. And so in order to know the meaning, you have to go and look at the reference: P1 has different meanings for different node types. If this is a column node, P1 must mean "pointer to the table node" and P2 means "pointer to the descriptor." I ended up having little pieces of paper hanging all over my office.
In one of the modules - I don't know who wrote that - it was about a semantic routine that checks on type compatibility. Franco wrote that? It had this interesting algorithm for checking type compatibility. You take "modulo" four and compare the result with the generic type to see if they are the same. You wondered, "Why modulo four?" It turned out that modulo four gives you four bits to use. I thought the designer must have thought that four bits was enough to cover any foreseeable type. If you have numeric types (two to the power four), you can have sixteen different numeric types; should be enough, right? Unfortunately, we have NULL and non-NULL, so that takes up two. Later on, we added Kanji support, which reserved double-byte NULL and double-byte non-NULL. So each numeric type took up four codes. Then we had INTEGER and SMALL INTEGER, which took up eight codes. When we productized the code, we had to add DECIMAL and FLOATING POINT. That took up all 16 codes. Unfortunately, once we got the code out the door, customers asked for short FLOAT instead of long FLOAT to save disk space, and some asked for 16-byte FLOAT and 31-byte DECIMAL for more precision. So much for modulo four!
As I mentioned before, I always admire all the System R people. I think they're great inventors, not only on algorithms and doing all the great work, but they are also very good in creativity, in inventing things, such as words like "Search Argument" making it into an adjective: sargable So when I talk to a customer, I always say, "This is a sargable predicate." They look at me and say, "What?"
Jim Gray: Everybody has sargable predicates now: Sybase and Oracle ...
Josephine Cheng: Yes, and customers diligently look up the meaning in the dictionary. So the people who write the manuals - our ID folks - they didn't like that. And they named it Type 1 predicate: that means it can be processed by the Data manager; Type 2 predicate: by RDS - I don't like that; I really want to call them sargable predicate.
Anyway, I had lots of fun looking at System R code and productizing it. As a matter of fact, when we finished our first driver, we felt such relief - if we had not taken the System R code, I don't think we would have made our DB2 Release 1.
Bob Yost: What were your instructions? Were you told to take basically the RDS, because you had another Data Manager? It wasn't going to be the one from System R, but you were taking the top half of the System R technology as sort of a blue-print. Were you inspired by it, or were you to look at the code and try to translate it? Now when they went to Endicott, they just said, "Take the code. Just translate it; don't even think about it." But you must have had different instructions.
Josephine Cheng: Well our instructions were to make it work. [laughter] The first thing that we did was to try to understand it, so I think I contacted every single person in the room: Mario, Pat, Don - trying to decipher and understand what it's trying to do. For our first release, we would translate all that code so it would work with our system code: the storage manager, and trace, accounting - you know, all the productization work. We tried also to add some features to the Release 1, but not really that many - only those that we needed for commercial use. So we added floating point, and decimal. At the time, I took Optimizer; Jerry Baker took ASLGEN; and Nick Nomm took ODEGEN. Back then machine time was more expensive than human salary, so we went to work on Saturdays and Sundays. The three of us were occupying the whole floor on Saturdays and Sundays. We did all the RDS work and Jerry had the idea that we should go and support symmetric view. It means when you select something from a view, you should get a failure code if you try to insert out of the scope of the view. So we also added the symmetric view function to Release 1. So the goal of Release 1 was essentially trying to make it work, add very minimum function, and get it out of the door as soon as possible.
John Nauman: It was a lot of the same stuff that was going on at Endicott; that is, there was a translation from PL/1 to PL/S; we had to do that.
Josephine Cheng: That was already done by Endicott.
John Nauman: So we had to do that, but that was done by Endicott, so we could take that. The amount of additional work was relatively small, except in the precompiler area, where we did, I think, quite a bit of things.
Roger Miller: Where we had to refit and refit and refit because we learned what the System R code needed. I built the PTREE many times.
Josephine Cheng: Anyway, that was a really fun experience.
C. Mohan: Did you watch the tapes in the process of doing this work?
Josephine Cheng: We did. We also had everybody from the RDS group come to STL and give us tutorials, and we videotaped those, too. The folk at Almaden have been very cooperative. Any questions that we asked, we always got the answer back, and anything that we needed help on, we always got immediately.
John Nauman: There was a lot of concern, I know, when we made the decision to go with the RDS stuff, that the System R people wouldn't be there, and that was one of the things that worried Don and me a lot in addition to the underlying MVS stuff, and that was never the case. I agree with what Josephine said: if we had gone off and just started from scratch to do our own thing, it may or may not have gotten out. The final part may or may not have gotten out in the same time frame, but it certainly would have taken a lot longer to get the prototype up, and approval for what we were doing. So it helped a lot, I think, in that area.
 Roger Miller notes: "HOP is the System R flavor of High Performance Optimizer, as I remember it."
 OLTP stands for Online Transaction Processing.
 The RSS supported a simple search capability: you could specify a "search argument" (SARG) of a simple comparison in canonical form (e.g., salary greater than constant) and the RSS would perform the search along a specified path. This offered performance advantage. To use this the higher level software had to recognize when SARGs could be used. If the SQL statement itself contained a predicate that could fit the SARG model, then the predicate was called sargable.
 ID stands for Information Developer.